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The first and primary concern with plurality voting is the possibility of a so-called spoiler. A spoiler is a non

votes. Supporting a similar candidate in addition to the frontrunner does not damage the frontrunner's chances of winning to a less popular candidate. According to Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, this makes approval voting more faithful than the current plurality voting system (Suri 2015).

Another market imperfection we see empirically in plurality voting is called "wasted vote syndrome". In plurality elections, candidates other than the two frontrunners find it hard to garner support, even when it exists within the electorate. Voters who want to maximize the effectiveness of their vote lack incentive to vote for a preferred candidate with little chance of winning. Instead, they choose between the "lesser of two evils".

In this sense, the sovereignty voters maintain over their own ballot is not maximized. Voters are incentivized to insincerely vote for candidates with better chances of winning instead of whom they truly prefer. The lack of flexibility in plurality voting inhibits the ability of the electorate to accurately project its will (Baharad and Nitzan 2005).

There is a marginal increase in voter sovereignty when switching from plurality to approval voting. In an approval voting system, voters have greater flexibility over their ballot. In "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Steven Brams explains "Approval voting gives [voters] the opportunity to be sovereign by expressing their approval for any set of candidates, which no other voting system permits" (2006). Voters have the full capacity to show their support for every candidate they approve of and withhold support from all candidates of whom they disapprove.

The will of the electorate is not always well represented in the outcome of an election under a plurality system. When looking at election results, approval for the top contending candidates tend to be skewed upwards and approval of weaker candidates is skewed

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downwards. Voters ignore their favorite candidates and cast votes instead for an acceptable candidate with a better chance of winning. As a result, information about the electorate's policy preferences is not always communicated accurately.

For instance, in partisan elections, the vote for third parties like the Green Party and the Libertarian Party are artificially low. This may cause some to believe that support for the policies of these parties is also low. However, this is only a result of the strong incentives for voters to vote insincerely in the plurality system (Weber 2007).

Robert Weber explains, "While the winner is often the same, approval voting is more effective than either the plurality rule or Borda's rule in showcasing an election outcome which well-represents the preferences of the electorate" (2007). Approval voting helps the electorate accurately convey which policy platforms they support by voting in approval of the candidates who represent them.

In this respect, the utility of a voter's ballot is increased. An elector can cast a vote for candidate A who has a high chance of winning and for another candidate B, whose policy platform they wish to have a heightened profile. In this case, candidate B's chance of winning is unimportant. The voter instead is signaling to candidate A, and other policy makers, that candidate B's platform has support among the electorate. The increase in information about the electorate T3 1 Tf [(i) 0.2 (c) 0.2 (y)] TJ 8m 0 lo.24 71.84 7 q 0.24 (i)n elps polchea akersy maky m

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one(Center for Election Science 2015) This strategy may be attractive for voters who will not want to hurt their favorite candidates by voting for anyone else. Switching voting would marginally decrease the magnitude in benefits of increased voter sovereignty and the increased information of policy preferences under approval voting.

Free and fair elections are a public good. The government should ensure that our election systems produce the most optimal outcomes for the electorate as a whole. Since it is almost universally agreed that plurality voting suffers from too many failures, we consistently produce fair and representative outcomes. It is appropriate for the Colorado General Assembly to begin experimenting with other voting systems that could produce better outcomes.

Approval voting would remedy some of the major market imperfections we see in the current plurality system. The spoiler effect, which can drastically influence elections, is nonexistent in approval voting. In addition, approval voting allows for maximum voter flexibility creating little incentive for voters to hide their preference for any candidate they find acceptable.

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